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CURRENT RELIGIOUS CHANGES IN SERBIA
AND DESECULARIZATION*
Abstract: For the contemporary Serbian sociology of religion it is evident
that the process of desecularizationhas been present on the social scene of Serbia in
the last fifteen years. Sociologists have provided arguments for this claim based on
data gathered in Serbia during this period. The religious changes in question have
been empirically recorded in all aspects of attachment to religion (mainly Eastern
Orthodoxy) and the church (Serbian Orthodox Church), that is, in aspects of religi-
ous identification, doctrinal beliefs and religious behaviour. Certain political sub-
jects and social scientists feel that social life in Serbia is getting increasingly, and
that religion and church are exerting influence within social fields they are not sup-
posedto, ifSerbiaistobecome a secular, democraticstate.The paperanalyzessome
major conditions of the clericalization of the Serbian society.
Key words: desecularization, clericalization, transition, contemporary Ser-
bian society, Orthodoxy, Serbian Orthodox Church.
TobeengagedinscientificresearchofreligioninSerbianow-
adays, and especially in empirical research of religious changes in
Eastern Orthodoxy, does not imply simply researching an exotic
spiritual and social phenomenon like thirty years ago, which, accor-
ding to the public opinion of the time, belonged rather to the past
than the present, rather to a “museum of antiqueities’’than a living
socialphenomenon,rathertoasmallgroupofuneducated, marginal-
ized and committed people than the majority of citizens, propulsive
and elite social groups. The situation has drastically changed. To be
engaged in the religious phenomenon nowadays, especially in the
processes of secularization and desecularization, actually means be-
ing modern, at the source of certain important social changes which
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* Thearticlewasapartoftheresearchprojectcalled“TheRegionalandEuro-
pean Aspects of the Integrative Processes in Serbia: Civilization’s Presumptions,
Reality and Future Prospects”, done by the Institutefor Philosophy and Social Theo-
ryfromBelgradeandfinancedbytheMinistryofScienceandEnvironmentalProtec-
tion of the Republic of Serbia (no. 149031).in the Balkans can by no meansbe understood outside of the confes-
sional, religious and national contexts. More importantly, it is much
more politically acceptable nowadays to be in contact with religion
in accordance with scientific principles and draw conclusions on the
religious situation within a particular area without the burden of a
politically correct and expected religious scene. It may be argued
that the general social settings for religious research have changed
significantly. These social settings, among other things, led the pri-
vatized, marginalized and stigmatized religion and numerous con-
fessions to emerge from the underground into the light and to start
playing important public roles, something that just 15 or 20 years
ago could not be foreseen.
Such a situation has opened widely the door for the sociology
of religion to study in vivo the religious phenomenon with its differ-
ent aspects in action, that is, the wayreligions and confessions influ-
ence the opinions and behaviour of manypeople who have suddenly
found themselves in very difficult, ambivalent war and post-war sit-
uations being full of hope, exaltation, fanaticism and unrealistic ex-
pectations atfirst,andthen ofdespair,hopelessness, deprivation and
frustrationsofallkinds,ending upinastateofresignation inthepast
coupleofyears.Although intheearly1990sitwasbelieved thatSer-
bian sociology of religion would fully take advantage of the newly
opened opportunities, now we can only talk about partial success.
The few existing Serbian sociologists of religion have done a sub-
stantial job, if we bear in mind that they have lacked broad instuti-
onalized support totheresearch,especially empiricalresearch.They
had to overcome this lack through originality, enthusiasm and their
personal contacts.
If we make a comparison with the neighbouring countries,
then Serbian sociology of religion cannot claim systematic and rep-
resentative empirical evidence on current religious changes. Until
five or six years ago, even when there was opportunity to look into
conventional and unconventional religiousness on a representative
sample,sociologists failedtodoit,partlyduetothelackofasenseof
religion (although religion was an obligatory subject of research for
the pioneers of sociology) and mostly because there were not many
sociologists who were interested in empirical testing of hypotheses
on religiousness in the Serbian confessional area. However, altough
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able, Serbian sociology of religion nevertheless has had a few
strongholds that could be taken as a starting point for the research of
contemporary attachment to the church and religion: in the 1980s
this refers to a research madeby Djordjevic (D.Djordjevic, 1984), in
the early 1990s the study undertaken by the present author (Blagoje-
vic, 1995) and later on an omnibus research done in 1999 (Radisav-
ljevic-Ciparizovic, 2002), as well as a large number of other public
opinion researches or segmentary researches with modest samples
and goals. Allthese studies canbetaken asabasisformonitoringre-
ligious changes in Serbia fromthe seventies up to now. This body of
researchhasprovided agreatdealofargumentationforthethreeten-
dencies regarding the processes of secularization and deseculariz-
ation,thatis,theprocessesofatheization anddeatheization inSerbia
during the period in question. Up to the mid- or even late eighties of
the previous century, it was already obvious that people were dis-
playing a tendency to detach themselves from religion and church.
Thiswasusuallyviewedastheatheization ofthesocialistsociety,al-
though the sociologists of religion of the time were inclined to re-
gard this tendency as an indicator of the process of secularization.
Shyly at first, in the late 1980s, and quite openly in the early 1990s,
the revitalization of religion and church was becoming increasingly
obvious, with a large number of people growing close with mostly
renowned religious expressions and institutionalized religious orga-
nizations; religious pluralism was thriving, as was the case in the
geographical andconfessionalareasoftheformerSovietUnion.The
tendency manifested in several ways: as a reaffirmation and a revi-
talization of the church, as a retraditionalization and a retotalization,
as a revival of religion and church and the return of the holy, even as
a reconquista and a religious renaissance. Sociologists were in fa-
vour of terming this tendency “desecularization” of the postsocialist
society.Attheend ofthe1990s and thebeginning ofthenewmillen-
nium the tendency from the previous period settled as a relatively
stable and steady attachment of people towards religion and the
church, and as a very tight intertwining of the religious (ecclesiasti-
cal)andthepolitical (social),theprocesswhichcertainreligious and
social scientists tend toregardasclericalization ofthecontemporary
Serbian society.
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It is generally accepted that the socialist systemin formerYu-
goslaviacreatednon-stimulatingandbasicallyhostilesocialsettings
for religion and church in general. The first consequence of such a
treatment of religion and its institutionalized organizations by the
socialist government was not just their cultural and general social
demonopolization and marginalization, but particularly their eco-
nomic demonopolization. Of all religions the separation of the
church and the state struck Orthodoxy the hardest, since alienation
and separation from the state was directly opposite to the essence of
Orthodoxy, which throughout history built a relationship of under-
standing,cooperation andmutualsupport(symphony)withthestate.
This non-stimulating, general social setting and the atheistic, hege-
monicculturalpatternofthesocialistsocietyprovedtoberatherma-
leficent for the actual state of religiousness, its free expression and
the general attachment of people towards religion and church. The
consequences were perceptible on at least three levels: religion and
church definitely lost their social significance, conventional reli-
gious beliefs grew weaker, but the greatest decline was noted in the
field of religious and church rituals. In this way, Orthodox religious-
nessintheYugoslavsocialiststatecouldbeseenasspecificinregard
tothereligiousnessinothermonoconfessionalandmultireligiousar-
eas. It comprised continuous low scores of religious subjects in em-
pirical research, then an obvious dissolution of the dogmatic content
of faith, and a process of erosion of the conventional religious be-
haviour (D. Djordjevic, 1984).
Although at the very beginning of 1980s empirical evidence
could not prove beyond doubt that Orthodoxy was coming back to
the social scene in the local religious areas, it was during that period,
after the events in Kosovo (which was later to become the central so-
cial and political problem in former Yugoslavia, Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, the state union of Serbia and Montenegro, and finally
Serbiatoday),thatOrthodoxyemergedfromseveraldecadesofisola-
tion and being on the margins of social and political life in the social-
ist Yugoslav state, back onto the social and political scene. However,
in the late 1980s and early 1990s empirical sociological researchers
were already registering an increase in religiousness and a growing
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in the entire geographical and confessional area of former Yugosla-
via, even an increase in the Orthodox religiousness whose revitaliza-
tionwascomingratherlateincomparisonwithCatholicconfessional
areas of former Yugoslavia. The bulk of this revitalization of the reli-
gion and church was not a result of an eminently religious process in
terms of a sincere and deep change in the spiritual life of people, for
instance through their return to the long-forgotten God and religious
morality, through their aspiration to spiritualize their life and change
theirbehaviour(for,theperiodfromtheninetiesonwasmarkedbyan
incredible outburst of hate, violence and suffering in the territory of
theformerfederation).Rather,therevitalizationofreligionandchur-
ch in the entire area (and Orthodoxy is no exception) began within
majorsocio-politicalturbulencesthatmanifestedmainlyasaproduct
ofanobviousandlong-lastingsocialcrisis,andinthatwayasaresult
(butacauseaswell)ofthecollapseofsocialismandofsocial,territo-
rial, national and confessional homogenization of the population in
the republics of former Yugoslavia.
The position of an increasingly evident social significance, as
the most important characteristic of the revitalized Orthodoxy and
other confessions in the territory of former Yugoslavia, implied the
emergenceofreligion and church fromthemarginalityand socialex-
communication, and their transformation into one of the most impor-
tant social institutions with numerous public roles in the forthcoming
social events burdened with serious conflicts. Therefore, in the early
1980s and especially during the 1990s, Orthodoxy became the most
important, maybe even the key factor in the revived Serbian collec-
tive identity as a continuous and the only reliable guardian of tradi-
tion and historical memory. The Serbian Orthodox Church then took
on the role of the beacon in the protection and homogenization of the
Serbian national entity, with its social relevance and institutionalized
spiritual centralism, in the conditions of socialism still present at the
time,constantlygrowing.Suchcentralismbecameevenmoreevident
after the fall of socialism, when it was absolutely necessary to take
under protection and homogenize the Serbian national body in
Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and from the late 1990s onwards,
in Kosovo and Metohija as well. Therefore, during the period of gen-
eral politicization of culture in the entire territory of former Yugosla-
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most efficient spiritual resources in the national homogenization of
the population and their political mobilization for the conflicts to
come and during the conflicts themselves. So the collapse of social-
ism (communism) and the civil, international war served as the most
general social setting in which Orthodoxy was to regain its cultural
dominationandinstitutionalizedsignificanceandinfluenceitusedto
have. There could have been no revival of Serbian national identity
and Serbian state without the revival of Orthodoxy. The Serbian Or-
thodoxChurchisnotonlyareligiousinstitution,butanationaloneas
well, and probably the only institution that had never betrayed Ser-
bian people throughout history (Radic, 955:V; XVII-XVIII).
Religious changes in the Orthodoxy in the last fifteen years
have been empirically documented in all aspects of attachment to
Orthodoxy and the Serbian Orthodox Church, namely the aspects of
religious identification, doctrinal beliefs and religious ritual behav-
iour. During the previous decade the willingness of people to iden-
tify themselves in religious terms, to reveal their confessional be-
longing and to believe in God has grown. Likewise, changes in
religious consciousness had certain practical consequences for the
religious behaviour and beliefs among a great number of people in
Orthodox and multireligious areas of Serbia. Although only slight
changes were detected in the traditional attitude towards religion
andchurch,whichwasconsideredthemoststableinthepreviousde-
cades, certain changes were obvious in the essentially important ac-
tual religious behaviour in fulfilling religious commitments such as
liturgy,churchattendance, fastingetc.Fundamentalreligiousbeliefs
of Orthodoxy have also been revitalized, mostly those that were far
frombeingeschatological incharacter.Thefollowingtablesindicate
that religious changes in Serbia were following the direction of
desecularization of the Serbian society.
Table 1. Certain indicators of religiousness in Serbia in the last twenty
years (%)
Indicators/year of research 1982 1993 1999
Positive confessional identification 88.0 96.7 93.5
Self-declared classic religiousness 23.8 71.3 59.3
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years (%) (continued)
Indicators/year of research 1982 1993 1999
Child baptism 59.3 84.4 83.9
Celebration of religious holidays 57.9 93.3 86.6
Church burial - 92.4 86.1
Liturgy (all intensities) 6.8 26.3 48.1
Church attendance (all intensities) 25.5 70.5 74.8
Praying (all intensities) 24.4 77.7 69.7
Fasting 24.2 58.4 58.5
Believing in God 17.6 46.3 -
Believing in Jesus Christ 15.4 56.7 -
Believing in life after death 5.4 28.2 -
Ref: For 1982 Djordjevic’s research of religiousness in the predominantly Or-
thodox region of Niš (D.Djordjevic, 1984); for 1993 Blagojevic’s research of
the predominantly Orthodox region of Branicevo (Blagojevic, 1995); for 1999
the research made by the Institute for Sociological Research of the Faculty of
Philosophy in Belgrade on a sample representative for Serbia without Ko-
sovo and Metohija (Radisavljevic-Ciparizovic, 2005)
Table 2. Traditional attachment to religion and church in Serbia (%)
Attachment/year of research 1993 1999
Total attachment 68.7 74.6
Partial attachment 30.8 25.1
Total unattachment 0.5 0.3
Ref: Blagojevic, 1995; Radisavljevic-Ciparizovic, 2005
Table 3. Actual attachment to religion and church in Serbia (%)
Attachment/year of research 1993 1999
Total attachment 0.2 36.4
Partial attachment 85.2 43.5
Total unattachment 14.6 20.1
Ref: Blagojeviæ, 1995; Radisavljevic-Æiparizovic, 2005
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6By generalizing these and other empirical data which were
not stated in this text (see Blagojevic, 2005), it is possible to draw
several relevant conclusions that could be used to describe the cur-
rent process of religious changes in Serbian society:
1. By the 1990s, religiousness in all confessional and na-
tional groups in the territory of former Yugoslavia was growing,
although not at the same level, with the lowest number of religious
people being recorded among the Orthodox, the trend which was
later proved by the cited studies. However, an evident change in the
religiousness of population was detected in the Orthodox confes-
sion as well, which was neither accidental nor subject to greater
fluctuations. The increase of religiousness and the increased will-
ingness of people to identify themselves in confessional terms, al-
though already high, were closely related to broader social, that is,
eminently non-religious processes such as the collapse of socialism
asasocialsystemandtheterritorialandnationalhomogenizationat
thetimeofdisintegrationofthefederalstateandthecreationofsep-
arate national states. The analysis of quantitative data revealed that
it was through the religiousness of young generations that the sig-
nificant religious changes occurred, especially within the Orthodox
civilization. Another conclusion drawn from the research made in
the late 1980s and early 1990s pointed to a stable trend of religious
restructuring. The number of atheistically orientated people has
beendrasticallyreduced.Duringtheninetiesthewillingnessofpeo-
ple to identify themselves in religious terms, to reveal their confes-
sional belonging and to believe in God increased. It was clear that
religion was revitalizing in some components of the so-called reli-
gious consciousness.
2. During the nineties changes in the religious consciousness
ofthepopulation hadpractical consequences forreligious behaviour
and beliefs among a large number of people. The traditional attitude
towards religion and the church, which had been least controversial
even before, spread even more, so in the nineties there was a vast
majority of people in the homogenized Orthodox territories who
were traditionally attached to religion and the church. Some essen-
tially important religious behaviours such as praying, liturgy and
fasting during majorreligious holidays were also revitalized. Nowa-
daysthehomogenized Orthodox areacannolonger beconsidered as
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population “running away“ from religion and the church. Funda-
mental religious beliefs in Orthodoxy were also revitalized, primar-
ily those that were far from being eschatological in character.
3. In view of these religious changes, the portrait of a typical
believer at the end of the 1990s is very much different that of a typi-
cal believer in the eighties. Atypical believer used to be a woman, a
farmer or a worker or an elderly person, living in the country, not
very educated and belonging to a socially marginalized or under-
privileged social group. Today, a typical believer can be from either
ruralorurban background, either elderly oryoung, either maleorfe-
male, either uneducated or highly educated. The changed portrait of
typical believer displays all the relevant elementsof the sociological
analysisofmajorreligiouschangesincontemporarySerbiansociety.
Desecularization or clericalization of Serbian society
Before the 1990s, in the entire territory of socialist Yugosla-
via,andinSerbiaaswell,itwasunthinkable forthelawtoallowreli-
gious services in schools, hospitals, military and police institutions,
kindergartens and prisons. Churches were not regarded as public in-
stitutions and organizations nor were they allowed to establish insti-
tutions such as non-theological schools, kindergartens, general sec-
ondary schools, other trade and art schools or universities enjoying
complete autonomy and government support in termsof being equal
with the state-owned institutions providing their users public health
protection, student standard and other benefits identical with those
in public schools. These benefits and many others are now enjoyed
by churches and religious communities registered as legal entities
rather than civil associations, as they used to be before the recent
adoption of the Law on Church and Religious Communities. Ac-
cording to the law, religious communities may engage in trade and
other activities in accordance with legal regulations, that is, they are
allowed to establish profitable enterprises that they may run autono-
mously, radio and TV stations and other institutions of religious and
non-religious character. This completely changed way of handling
relations between thestateandreligious organizations, andtheobvi-
ousinfluenceofreligionandtheSerbianOrthodoxChurchonpublic
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6life in Serbia in recent years, provoked a reaction of some political
subjects and social scientists whohave argued that public lifeinSer-
bia is getting increasingly clericalized and that the church and reli-
gion are exerting influence in the areas where they shouldn’t if Ser-
bia is to become a secular, democratic country.
Sociologist Bozidar Jaksic has registered continuous attempts
and aspirations for the clericalization of Serbian society, and not just
through the endeavours of certain political subjects and some
high-rankingmembersoftheSerbianOrthodoxChurch,butsomere-
nowned democrat intelectuals as well (Svetozar Stojanovic, for ex-
ample). His claim that the process is not finished, that it is not even
dominant,butratherbi-directional,confusingandcontradictory,isof
crucial sociological significance. In some occasions it is a useful tool
for solving political crises in daily politics and in others it is about
fundamental, mortal endangerment of Serbian people that no other
system nor spiritual institution but the Serbian Orthodox Church can
salvage from disaster (Jaksic, 2001). Clericalization of public life
was not initiated solely from clerical circles, but it often presents a
blatant or hidden instrumentalization of religion and the church
whosefinaloutcomedoesnotservetheinterestsofthechurchbutthe
interests of various political groups instead. There are numerous ex-
amplesofthereturnofthechurchandreligionintopubliclife,butnot
allofthemprovetheprocessofclericalization:forinstance,theintro-
duction of religious education, first compulsory and then optional,
into primary and secondary schools; promotion of religion and the
church in the media through coverage of religious events but also
secular events accompanied by religious iconography; high regard
for the opinions of highly ranked church officials and practising be-
lievers on purely secular problems and issues; aspirations of the
members of church hierarchy to connect with the political subjects in
power in order to infiltrate into political circles, etc. And vice versa:
members of the political power are not indifferent towards the
church, especially towards the Serbian Orthodox Church, and they
willingly meet the demands of the church hierarchy. In that way the
distancebetween thestateand thechurch isgetting smaller,which is,
as Milan Vukomanovic points out, clearly leading towards the
clericalization of the Serbian society (Karabeg, 2004).
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political, military and economic power by the church and its attempt
to arbitrate in socially relevant issues weremostsystematicallycriti-
cized by Mirko Djordjevic (M.Djordjevic, 2005a; 2005b) who cites
manyexamplesofforcedclericalization. Describingtheinfluenceof
the church on the public life of Serbian society as a „wave of
clericalization“, he feels that the process “has gone really far” and
that there is a kind of consensus on the Serbian Orthodox Church
“beingtheonlyintegrative factor”andthusclaimingtheleading role
in society. “The Serbian Orthodox Church has long been a part of
public government and the constitutional regulations on the separa-
tion of the church and the state are of little significance” (M.Djor-
djevic, 2005a). Although we agree with this author on many com-
ments about the attempts of the church hierarchy and political and
social groups toclericalize the Serbian society,itismorethan neces-
sary to raise a purely sociological question regarding terminological
precision. Using in his analyses of church and social life the term
„desecularization“, he transfers the meaning of another term, the
term countersecularization, since it is precisely the latter term,
ratherthan„desecularization“, thatisopposite to„secularization“. If
secularization is an irreversible process, then a re-creation of class
society with a medieval role of gentry and clergy is beyond assump-
tion, but desecularization as a process and a “middle” term is not,
since the influence of the church and religion on the society may in-
creaseorreducethroughouthistory.Therefore,thistermisnotonthe
verge of delusion or utopia, as Mirko Djordjevic suggested, but can
be used quite legitimately in sociological issues, it can even be
operationalized through indicators that maybe presented both quali-
tatively and quantitatively.
Terminological problems, therefore, do not present a purely
academic taste for pinpoint accuracy. Even sociological arguments
lack a clear definition of basic terms at the beginning. It is often a
cause of unnecessary misunderstandings. What is clericalism really,
and along with it, the process of clericalization of a society? If we
definethisphenomenonasanaspiration ofcertainpolitical circlesto
make the church and clergy superior in the political and cultural liv-
es of a country or society, that is to place the interests of the church
above all others in the society so that church can impose its interests
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6on the society, the intention which has realistic political and eco-
nomicgrounds,thenitcannotbearguedthatclericalization ofSerbia
is an uncontroversial phenomenon. In a paper of his (Markovic,
2005) contemporary Serbian historian Slobodan Markovic thor-
oughly analysed the conditions of clericalization of a democratic so-
ciety and concluded that contemporary Serbian society was not
clericalized. Instead, it was actually another process in action in the
history of modern Serbia (during the last two hundred years): the
process of caesaropapism.
For the process of clericalization to be effective in Serbia,
Markovic quotes three conditions that have to be met:the number of
institutionalized, practicing believers mustconsiderably exceed half
of the total population; there must be a tradition of strong clerical
spirit; and the church and clergy mustpossess enough economic and
political powertoimposethemselvesasanequalorevenseniorpart-
ner on the state. The first condition is not met in contemporary Ser-
bia, and it is debatable if it has ever been. That is, according to the
2002 census and sociological and public opinion surveys in the last
15years,itisobvious thatthenumberofdeclaredbelieversinSerbia
islarge,evenupto95%,85%ofwhomareofOrthodoxreligion. But
of all indicators of attachment to religion and the church this one is
the weakest. How many believers are there in Serbia today who are
closely and ardently connected to the church? There are definitely a
lot less of them than confessionally declared believers, and that is a
weak potential for the effective clericalization of a society.
In the recent history of Serbia, Markovic feels, there hasn’t
been a tradition of clerical spirit that modern clericalism could build
on successfully. Before the first Serbian uprising, a part of the popu-
lation had left Serbia with patriarch Arsenije III Carnojevic during
the Great Migrations in 1690 and settled in the Hungarian part of the
Habsburg monarchy, where Serbs and their church were tolerated as
a minority, so there could have been no clericalization under those
conditions. The Serbian people and the Patriarchy of Pec had to put
up with the Turkish power that always used to have a caesaropapist
attitude towards Christian churches and never had any restraints to
kill any bishop that might stand in their way. After the Serbian revo-
lution in 1804, during the 19th century, it was evident that the state
was trying to interfere in church affairs and had a caesaropapist atti-
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the non-canonic appointments of the highest church officials and
even their physical elimination (Milos Obrenovic had the first Ser-
bian bishop Milentije Niksic strangled) are evidence enough that
there could have been no clericalization under such circumstances,
but only moreor less obvious state interference in church affairs and
a strong, “Constantinian embrace” that the church could not escape
even after World War II. Therefore, it could be said that state inter-
ference in church affairs and exploitation of the church for the pro-
motion of secular, partial political interests have never really stop-
ped, except for a short period of time before the World War II when
the Serbian Orthodox Church was the only one with enough power
to challenge the state. Not even clerical political movements, foun-
ded in the twentieth century, have ever had a serious voter support,
so they have been kept aside in the political life ofthe country.Inso-
cialist Yugoslavia the political capital of the church was extremely
low, since religion and the church were stigmatized and margin-
alized, not only politically but also economically. Thus, in the last
sixty years the Serbian Orthodox Church has never been a signifi-
cant economic factor in Serbia. Markovic argues that no conditions
that could indicate clericalization of Serbian society have been met,
but there are certain indications that the caesaropapist attitude to-
wards the church is becoming weaker and it is time the church itself
finally broke free of the state or the political elite in power.
It is true that if the state returned to the churches, and espe-
cially the Serbian Orthodox Church, the property confiscated after
World War II, economic empowerment of the church would become
realistic. This is supported by the fact that the contemporary Serbian
state is far more generous in financing and supporting the construc-
tion of new churches and restoration of the old churches in Serbia
thantwentyyearsago.Alongwiththeincreasedpublic,andevenpo-
litical influence of the Serbian Orthodox Church in Serbian society
today, elements of the process of clericalization would not be so dis-
putable as they may seem now. Therefore, there are elements that
suggest a much tighter connection between the church and the state
in Serbia today than in the past. The church has become one of the
basic institutions of the contemporary Serbian society, and the Or-
thodox religion hasbecomeanabsolute factandtheleading spiritual
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6guidance inthesearchoftheSerbianpeoplefortheirlostidentity.To
be terminologically correct, the increased influence that the church
has been exercising on the society in the last decade and ahalf, and a
stronger commitment to religion and church, are at this moment
better termed as a process of desecularization. Namely, the cleric-
alization of the society pushed to its limits would actually present a
countersecularization of the society that would be hard to conceive
not only in Europe but in post-Milosevic Serbia as well.
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Mirko Blagojeviæ
SAVREMENE RELIGIJSKE PROMENE U SRBIJI
I DESEKULARIZACIJA
Sa etak
U savremenoj srpskoj sociologiji religije nije sporno da je u poslednjih pet-
naestak godina na društvenoj sceni proces desekularizacije. Sociolozi su taj proces
argumentovali pozivajuæi se na iskustvenu evidenciju koja je za to vreme stvorena u
Srbiji. Navedene religijske promene empirijski su evidentirane u svim segmentima
vezanostiza religiju(prevashodno za pravoslavlje)i crkvu (SPC), dakle:u segmentu
religijskog identifikovanja, doktrinarnog verovanja i religijsko-obrednogponašanja.
Postoji mišljenje nekih politièkih subjekata i društvenih nauènika da se društveni
 ivot u Srbiji sve više klerikalizuje i da religija i crkva ispoljavaju svoj uticaj tamo
gde ne bi smelo da ga bude ukoliko Srbija treba da bude laièka, demokratksa dr ava.
U tekstu se analiziraju neki od va nih uslova klerikalizacije društva.
Kljuène reèi: desekularizacija, klerikalizacija, tranzicija, savremeno srpsko
društvo, pravoslavlje, Srpska pravoslavna crkva.
253
F
I
L
O
Z
O
F
I
J
A
I
D
R
U
Š
T
V
O
3
/
2
0
0
6